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 Abstract 
 
OECD tax revenue statistics show that on average the share of consumption 
tax is almost equal to that of income tax.  However, consumption tax hardly 
attracts any attention from intermediate macroeconomic textbooks, not to 
mention its inclusion in IS-LM model.  This paper compares the IS curves 
under an income tax regime and a general consumption tax regime.  It also 
examines the trade off between the income tax rate and the consumption tax 
rate in a dual tax regime.   
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1.  Introduction 
 
An examination of the OECD government revenue statistics reveal that in the last 
decade, there is a spread in the use of general consumption taxes, especially the VAT type, to 
replace specific consumption taxes.1  General consumption taxes are now in place in 29 of the 
3O OECD countries (with the exception of the USA, which only has state and local sales 
taxes).   As a matter of fact, a comparison of the 1985 data (Krusell et al., 1996) and the 1998 
data (OECD, 2001b, p.13) on shares of tax revenue shows that the percentage of consumption 
taxes has slightly increased over the 13 years by about one per cent from 31 to 32 per cent 
while the percentage of income taxes has slightly decreased from about 36 to 35 per cent.2   
 
Table 1:  Percentage shares of tax revenues, OECD countries, 1985-1998 
 Tax type and OECD code 
 
Unweighted 
OECD 
average 
Income  
(Personal and 
Corporate) 
1000 
 
Social Security 
2000 
 
Goods and 
Services 
5000 
 
Others (incl. 
3000, 
4000, and 6000) 
1985 36.1 24.7 31.3 7.5 
1998* 34.7 24.9 32.3 7.7 
Changes - 1.4 + 0.2 + 1.0 + 0.2 
* Based on the 23 member countries in 1985.  They were Australia, Austria, Belgium,  
Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan,  
Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland,  
Turkey, UK, and USA. 
Sources:  OECD (2001b, p.11), OECD (2003), and Krusell et al. (1996) 
 
There are various arguments for a general consumption tax but what I am concerned 
here is its incorporation into the IS-LM model in intermediate macroeconomic textbooks.3,4  I 
sample a list of intermediate macroeconomic textbooks—Blanchard (2000), DeLong (2002), 
Farmer (1999), Hall and Taylor (1999), Mankiw (2003), Miles and Scott (2002), Pentecost 
(2000), and Taylor and Moosa (2000)—and as far as I am aware, general consumption tax 
hardly attracts any attention in the IS-LM model, which is still an important analytical tool at 
that level of instruction.  Nevertheless, Taylor and Moosa (2000, pp. 455-7) did examine the 
one-off price effect of the imposition of a general consumption tax in an economic 
fluctuations model represented by an inflation-rate-real-GDP diagram.5 
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In my intermediate macroeconomic unit, I incorporate a general consumption tax 
component into the IS-LM assignment.6,7  The students’ feedback were positive and they 
appreciated the more realistic approach.  An IS-LM model with a consumption tax component 
gives them a tool to analyze (a) the impact of an imposition of a general consumption tax, (b) 
the effect of a change in consumption tax rate, and (c) the trade off between consumption and 
income tax rates to maintain tax revenue neutrality.  I deem that the inclusion of a general 
consumption tax has enriched my students’ learning experience.  The aims of this paper are 
(a) to compare the IS curves under a consumption tax regime with that under an income tax 
regime, and (b) to explore the trade-off between income and consumption tax rates. 
 
In the next section, I review a typical three-sector IS-LM model with a proportional 
income tax.  In section two, I set out the alternative IS-LM model with a consumption tax 
regime.  I also briefly discuss the possible questions about switching from an income tax to a 
consumption tax regime.  In section three, I examine the IS-LM model with both kinds of 
taxes.  I focus on the trade off between the two kinds of taxes given tax-revenue neutrality.  I 
also include a numerical example to illustrate the trade-off.  Section four is the summary.       
 
2. The IS-LM Model with an Income Tax 
 
This section presents a typical IS-LM model for a closed economy presented in 
intermediate macroeconomic textbooks, for example, Mankiw (2003, pp. 307-9).  The model 
is encapsulated in following four equations   
The total demand function:  o
D GrIYCE ++= )()(   
The money demand function:  ( )   ),( rYLmPM dd ==
The equilibrium condition in the product market:  Y   E=
The equilibrium condition in the financial market:  m   0mm
sd ==
where E is total demand for goods and services, C is consumption, Y is disposal (real) 
income, I is investment, r is real interest rate, is government spending, M is money, P is 
general price level, is demand for real balances, L is liquidity, Y is real income or real 
GDP, is the supply of real balances, and is real money balances.   
D
oG
0
dPM )/(
sm m
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To facilitate the discussion, I specify the linear form of the consumption function, 
investment function, tax function, and money demand function as 
D
Yo YCCC +=   (1) 
rIII ro −=   
YtT =  (2) 
rLYLm rY
d −=   
where C is baseline consumption, C is marginal propensity to consume, is baseline 
investment, is interest sensitivity of investment, T is tax revenue, t is proportional income 
tax rate, is income sensitivity of demand for money, and is interest sensitivity of 
demand for money.  Without further ado, the equations of the IS and the LM curve are 
o
L
Y oI
rI
Y rL
Y
I
tC
I
GIC
r
r
Y
r
ooo )1(1 −−−++=  (3) 
and 
Y
L
L
L
m
r
r
Y
r
+−= 0   
respectively.  And the equilibrium values are 
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ooo
LαtC
mαGIC
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)1(1
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YrYr
YYooo
LItCL
mtCLGIC
r +−−
−−−++=
)]1(1[
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* 0  with 
r
r
L
I
α = .  From equation (3), we know that a 
change in the income tax rate rotates the IS curve anticlockwise for ∆  and clockwise for 
with the vertical intercept as the pivot point.  For the comparative statics of the IS-LM 
model with an income tax regime, they are well covered in any of the intermediate 
macroeconomic textbooks. 
0>t
0<∆t
 
3. The IS-LM Model with a Consumption Tax 
 
With a general consumption tax and no income tax, we need to rewrite the tax equation (2) 
to become equation (2’)   
CvT =  (2’) 
where v is the proportional consumption tax rate.  With a general consumption tax, the 
concept of disposable income Y and the determination of consumption level are not as clear-
cut as those described in textbooks.  Household consumption C depends on the level of Y  
D
D
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but the latter also depends on how much the households consume.  This feedback loop makes 
the derivation of the IS equation more complicated for students.  When I substitute the 
consumption, the investment, and the tax equations into the equilibrium condition of the 
product market, the substitution goes on forever with the following equation emerging:  
oro
nn
Y
n
YYYo GrIIvCvCvCYCCY +−+−+++−+= ))1(1()( 22 L   
With the sum of the geometric series equals 1 , the above equation can be 
rearranged to give the equation of the consumption-tax IS curve: 
)1/( vCY+
Y
vCI
vC
vCI
GIvCC
r
Yr
Y
Yr
ooYo 


+
−−−+
+++=
)1(
)1(1
)1(
)()1(
 (4) 
This equation is far more complex than the income-tax IS equation, described by equation 
(3); the consumption tax rate v appears in the numerator and the denominator of both the 
intercept and the slope.  Consequently, a change in v not only rotates the IS curve but also 
shifts the IS curve at the same time.  This contrasts to the pure rotation effect of a change in 
the income tax rate.  Partial derivatives of the intercept and the slope with respect to v show 
that a change in the consumption tax rate shifts the IS curve (to the left for and to the 
right for ) and rotates it (anticlockwise for  and clockwise for ) with the 
vertical intercept as the pivot point.  With the LM curve remains the same, the equilibrium 
values for Y is Y*= 
0>∆v
0<∆v0<∆v 0>∆v
)
1(0
vC
Cm
Y
+
1()1(1
))1()(
LαvC
vαvCGIC
YY
YYooo
++−−
++++
. 
 
3.1 Some questions about switching tax regime 
 
There are some interesting questions about switching tax regime.  Firstly, does the 
switch from one tax regime to another involve same tax revenue?  And is tax revenue neutral 
equivalent to real GDP neutral?  Secondly, what is the position (indicated by the intercept and 
the slope) of the consumption-tax IS curve as compared to that of the income-tax IS curve?  
Thirdly, what is the value of the tax revenue neutral consumption tax rate?   
 
It is reasonable to argue that a new tax regime is at least tax revenue neutral or tax 
revenue enhancing in its inceptive year for the government to fulfill its financial 
commitments.  It is more likely to be tax revenue neutral to avoid the accusation of revenue 
grabbing.  And as long as tax revenue does not change, real GDP remains at the same level.8  
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To see this assertion, refer to the other definition of real GDP where Y is the sum of C, saving 
S and T.  Since both C and S are functions of Y , which in turn depends on T given Y, a 
stable tax liability means stable consumption and saving, ceteris paribus.  That is, tax revenue 
neutrality implies real GDP neutrality.  The numerical example in the next section attests to 
the validity of this assertion.  Another reason that the government may prefer to maintain 
neutrality is that a depletion or enhancement creates an economic shock that the government 
has to handle on top of the administrative problems of changing the tax system.    
D
 
How does the position of a consumption-tax IS curve compare to its income tax 
counterpart?  Since I have adopted the same set of equations except the tax equation, I can 
compare equations (3) and (4) to discern their differences.  Apparently, the consumption-tax 
IS curve has a lower intercept than that of the income-tax IS curve because 
roYro ICvCIC <+ )1( .  It is however more difficult to ascertain the relative values of the 
slopes of the two IS curves.  With tax-revenue and real-GDP neutrality (at least in the short 
run and no change in monetary policy) the equilibria of the economy with the two tax regimes 
must be the same.  A lower intercept of the consumption-tax IS curve implies it has to have a 
relatively flatter slope as depicted in Figure 1.  Suppose the economy starts with an initial 
equilibrium point A, the relatively steeper and solid ISY is the income-tax IS curve and the 
relatively flatter and broken ISC is the consumption-tax IS curve. 
 r 
 
ISC’ 
Y 
LM 
ISC 
ISY  
A  
ISY’ 
B’ 
B  
H  r* 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
YY* Y*  YC* 
Figure 1:  Effectiveness of fiscal policy under different tax regime 
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A relatively flatter ISC also implies that fiscal policy is relatively less effective in an 
economy with a consumption tax than one with an income tax.  Again refer to Figure 1.  An 
equal increase in government expenditure G causes both IS curves to shift to the right by the 
same amount to point H.  The new equilibrium for an income tax regime is point B and for a 
consumption tax regime is point B’.  It is apparent that fiscal policy is less effective under a 
consumption tax regime.  This observation can be safely extended to a tax regime with a 
consumption tax component. 
o
 
As for the third question, it is best handled in a dual-tax regime, which will be discussed 
in the next section.   
 
4. The IS-LM Curve with Both Taxes 
 
Replace the tax equation (2) by one with both income and consumption taxes: 
CvYtT +=  (2”) 
Without repeating the derivation process, the equation of the dual-tax IS curve is 
( ) ( ) YvCI
vCtC
I
GI
vCI
C
r
Yr
YY
r
oo
Yr
o 


+
+−−−+++= 1
)1(1
1  (5) 
The introduction of a consumption tax into an economy with only income tax again 
lowers the intercept and flattens the slope of the IS curve.  The observations pertain to a 
consumption tax regime again apply here.  The higher the consumption tax rate, the flatter the 
IS curve and the lower its vertical intercept.  Figure 2 depicts the IS curves of the three tax  
 
LM  
Y* 
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ISY  
ISY+C 
A  
r* 
Y 
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Figure 2:  The IS curves under the three tax regimes 
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regimes under tax-revenue neutrality and ISY+C is one of the many possible IS curves 
(depends on the combination of t and v) of a dual-tax regime.  Note that the value of v in 
equation (5) is less than that in equation (4) due to the presence of income tax and tax-revenue 
neutrality. 
 
The inclusion of both taxes facilitates the study of trade off between the two tax rates 
under the condition of tax-revenue and real-GDP neutrality.  To calculate the trade-off ratio 
between the two tax rates, substitute repeatedly the consumption equation (1) into tax 
equation (2”) yields 
))1(1()( 22 nnY
n
YYYYo vCvCvCYCtYCCvYtT −+++−−++= L   
Again apply the sum of the geometric series, I have 



+
−++=
vC
YtCC
vYtT
Y
Yo
1
)1(
 (6) 
Total differentiate equation (6) and set dT , and using the equilibrium 
value 
0==== Yo dCdCdY
tCvC
vCmα
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+
)
)1(0
LαvC
vCGIC
YY
Yooo
++−−
++++=
1()1(1
)1()(
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∂
tCBLαC
vCBC
t
v
YYo
Yo  (7) 
where .  There is a negative trade off between the two tax rates, indicated 
by the negative sign of the partial derivative 
0mαGIB oo ++=
tv ∂∂ , to maintain tax-revenue neutrality. That 
is, ( 0 ) implies ( ) to keep ∆ .  I call this partial derivative the 
trade-off ratio and its value is determined by all the parameters in the system of equations.  
The trade-off ratio is less than zero because consumption tax has a narrower tax base than 
income tax.  Let say there is a cut in the income tax by , the first round increase in 
disposable income is .  The increase in disposable income is allocated to 
consumption and saving.  Therefore, from the government viewpoint, − for 
.  To maintain revenue neutrality, the government has to have − .  A 
numerical example is given below to illustrate my point.    
0< >∆t
∆Y D
v∆=
∆t
t∆
0>∆v
∆−= tY
0<∆v
0>
0=T
<∆t 0
vCtY ∆>∆
vt ∆<∆−
 
Equation (8) summaries the effect of a change in each parameter on the value of trade-
off ratio:  
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),,,,,,,,,,( 00
−++++−++++−=∂
∂
rYrYooo LLICPMGICvtft
v  (8) 
It is important to note that the “+” (“ – “) sign on top of a parameter in the above equation 
indicates smaller (larger) trade off between the two tax rates.  It is also important to point out 
that the trade-off ratio varies with the structure of the economy, represented by all the 
parameters.  That is, a different starting point (e.g., a different combination of the initial v and 
t) entails a different value of trade-off ratio.   
 
4.1 A numerical example 
 
SupposeC ,C , , , , ,
,  (represents an index of 400),G .  With t = 20%, the 
equilibrium values of the economy are: Y* = $582.41b, T* = $116.48b, Y =$465.93b, C* = 
$359.44b, public saving T* - G* = -$83.52b, share of government = 34.34%, r* = 0.47%, I* = 
$22.96b, private saving = $106.48%, and national saving rate = 3.94%. 
b10$=o
40 =P
75 400$=oI.0=Y b 800$=rI
b200$0 =
b .0=YL 9 900$=rL
*D
b
b400$0 =M
 
The trade off between income and consumption tax rates can be obtained by applying 
the values of the parameters to equation (7).  The result is 6203.1−=∂∂ tv , which means a 
one per cent reduction in income tax rate requires a 1.6203 per cent increase in consumption 
tax rate to maintain the tax revenue.  To ascertain the validity of the concept, I calculate the 
equilibrium set of values for the following three cases with t = 20% and v = 0% as the 
baseline: (a) dual tax regime with t = 15% and v = 8.10%, (b) dual tax regime with t = 13.83% 
and v = 10%, and (c) single tax regime with v = 32.41.  Lo and behold, their equilibrium sets 
of values are the same (allowing for rounding error).9  The equations of the four IS curves are 
tabulated in Table 2 and the results agree with the pattern shown in Figure 2. 
 
Table 2:  IS equations under different tax regimes 
 Tax regime Equation of IS curve 
Income tax regime with t = 20% r = 0.7625 – 0.0005000Y 
Dual tax regime with t = 15% and v =8.1015% r = 0.7618 – 0.0004988Y 
Dual tax regime with t = 13.8283% and v = 10% r = 0.7616 – 0.0004985Y 
Consumption tax regime with v =32.4060% r = 0.7601 – 0.0004958Y 
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5. Summary 
 
I consider that the incorporation of a general consumption tax in the IS-LM model 
brings it more in line with the reality that students experience.  Even though the mathematics 
involved is more complicated, the inclusion of a general consumption tax allows students to 
appreciate (a) the effect of a change in the consumption tax rate, and (b) the trade off between 
income and consumption tax rates.  It is also found that fiscal policy is less effective with a 
consumption tax component than without. 
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NOTES 
 
1. The most recent example is Australia.  In July 2000, the Australian Commonwealth 
Government introduced the Goods and Services tax (GST)—a VAT-type general 
consumption tax—to replace its wholesale sale taxes (six different rates), financial 
institution duties, debit tax, conveyancing duties on business property and five other 
stamp duties.   
 
2. Quite a few economists, e.g. Krusell et al. (1996), regard social security tax as income 
tax because it is income based.  If we take this position, then the share of income taxes 
has decreased from 61 per cent to 60 per cent over the 13-year period.  
 
3. Normally, the base of a general consumption tax should logically include all goods and 
services, which may not be politically acceptable.  In fact, the Australian GST has 
exemption (i.e., zero rating) on several kinds of goods and services (food, health, 
education, childcare services, hospitals and nursing homes, local government rates, 
water and sewerage charges, and charitable activities) to increase the progressivity of 
the tax.  
 
4. Consumption is regarded as a greener and equitable tax than income tax in the sense that 
economic agents are taxed according to the resources they use up (i.e., actual 
consumption) rather than their potential consumption.  For a survey, see Atkinson and 
Stiglitz (1987, pp. 563-6). 
 
5. When Australia introduced its GST in July 2000, the impact was a one-off increase in 
quarterly inflation rate by 2.3%.  Similar patterns were observed in both New Zealand 
(1987) and Canada (1991). 
 
6. DeLong (2002) is the adopted textbook for my intermediate macroeconomic unit. 
 
7. It is an analytical exercise based on a case study using a four-sector IS-LM spreadsheet 
model. 
 
8. This is only valid in a very short-run model such as the IS-LM where prices are 
assumed to be rigid.  Inflation statistics show that the introduction of a general 
consumption tax creates a one-off direct effect on prices paid by consumers, which in 
turn lowers real GDP, ceteris paribus.  Also see end note 5.   
 
9. I did the calculation by an IS-LM spreadsheet model. 
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